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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the 
Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars 
of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of 
current interest to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background 
studies and as policy analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 





















































































































































































The EC Budget: Ten Per Cent Fraud? 
-  A Policy Analysis* -
D ic k  R u im sc h o t el* *
1. Political Interests at Stake
1.1 The Historical Context: Growing Concern
Ever since the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy in the early 
1960s, there have been complaints as to the existence and extern of fraud 
against the European Community. It was an EC customs official, Johannes, 
who ventured an estimate as to the real extent of fraud some twenty years 
ago (Johannes, 1971; quoted by Harding, 1982), The first Court of 
Auditor’s report (Court of Auditors, 1978) mentioned the question of fraud 
-  and of the impossibility of revealing all fraud by audit examinations -  
and has addressed the issue ever since, albeit under the name of irregularity. 
In its 1987 report an entire chapter was devoted to the subject calling for 
reforms (Court of Auditors, 1987; see also Kok, 1989, p. 360). Similarly, 
the European Parliament has expressed its concern over the years, 
culminating in a 1989 resolution on the prevention and combat of fraud in 
post-1992 Europe. This mentions legislation as one of the several causes of 
EC fraud and urges that adequate monitoring powers be invested by the 
Council in the Commission “ to keep track of how Community revenue and 
expenditure are managed by the Member States” (European Parliament, 
1989a and 1989b). One of the most forceful and authoritative statements 
made with regard to fraud against the Community came from the British 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, which 
referred to it as “a public scandal” (House of Lords, 1989). Moreover, EC
* A first version of this article was written when the author was Jean Monnet Fellow at 
the European Policy Unit of the European University Institute. Thanks are due to Ida 
Koppen, Hans Micklitz, Sol Picciotto, Francis Snyder, Thanasis Stengos and my editor, 
Clare Tame, for their comments.
* European Policy Unit/Law Department, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
(1990-1993). Current address: Sanders Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. 



























































































citizens’ concern with fraud has been kept alive by the media with stories 
of series of large-scale frauds in wine, olive oil and fish, supplemented by 
the occasional meat or maize fraud.'
Until 1988 it appeared that the fight against fraud was only stressed by 
the Parliament and the Court of Auditors, but since then support from the 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Court of 
Justice has been forthcoming. The Commission has coordinated and 
intensified its anti-fraud actions by establishing the “Unité de Coordination 
de la Lutte Anti-Fraude” (UCLAF) in 1988 (Commission, 1987, 1989). Its 
ambitious 45-item working programme, drawn up in 1989, and approved by 
the Member States and the Council, has now been in force for almost four 
years (Commission, 1990,1991, 1992). The general importance of fraud for 
the Commission is reflected in the President’s annual report on the 
Commission’s activities, that contains a paragraph on the fight against 
fraud. Also in 1989, the Council of Ministers (19 June, Luxembourg, 26 
and 27 June, Madrid) officially supported the intensified efforts of the 
Commission in fighting fraud. The Court of Justice (Court of Justice, 1989), 
deciding in a fraud case concerning maize claimed to have been grown in 
Greece itself but in fact imported from Yugoslavia, held that Member States 
are obliged to deal with EC fraud cases in a manner similar to the treatment 
of fraud cases under national laws, and that the enforcement of EC 
regulations should be sufficiently “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” .
The specific political and policy interests at stake when fraud occurs are 
well known: direct financial loss to the Community, the suboptimal 
attainment of EC objectives, the distortion of competition, and the threat to 
the overall credibility of the Community (see, for example, Myhlback, 
1985; Harding, 1982). These interests are harmed more when more fraud 
occurs; ironically credibility is endangered when frauds are being discov­
ered. Some political institutions and scientific commentators have ventured 
statements as to the overall extent of fraud -  referred to as the ‘dark 
number’ since official statistics are not conclusive about the real size of the 
phenomenon -  and the most recurrent of these claims is that at least 10 per 
cent of the total EEC budget is affected by fraudulent practices,2 whereas 
others refuse to quantify the overall problem.3 If fraud can be assumed to 
exist to varying degrees in different Member States, this clearly undermines 
the basic value of equality of Member States under the Treaty, threatening 
any existing fairness of financial contributions and allocations to the EC 
budget. Such uneven presence of fraud would be particularly unacceptable 
if it were the result of unequal national laws relating to the subject of law 
enforcement practices.4
The completion of the Single Internal Market as of 1 January 1993 and 




























































































checks (European Parliament 1989; Vervaele 1988) together with the 
impending reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) make a 
review of the problems that fraud poses for the EC particularly interesting. 
I will concentrate on fraud in relation to CAP expenditure,5 but most of the 
remarks also apply to other domains such as customs duties and agricultural 
levies, which, together with a part of Member States’ VAT-revenue, 
constitute the main sources of EC income.
Much has already been written on fraud against the European Community 
(Delmas-Marty 1982; Leigh 1980; Harding 1982; Tiedemann 1988; 
Vervaele 1989 and 1991; Sherlock and Harding 1991) and whole confer­
ences have been devoted to the problem (for example, Asser Institute 
Colloquium 1988; Commission Colloquium 1989).6 Most of the existing 
literature is written from a political or legal point of view extended to 
include all law enforcement aspects (see, for example, Harding, 1982). This 
paper, instead, aims at an analytical and normative policy analysis to show 
how the question of the overall extent of fraud against the Community fits 
into the overall problem of fraud, and how various considerations (political, 
economic, legal, policy and criminological) all play a role in the fight 
against fraud and in the pursuit of knowledge about the phenomenon.
1.2 The Context: Implicit Comparisons and Political Motives
To acknowledge the existence of a fraud is one thing, but to interpret it as 
a problematic or unacceptable phenomenon is another. Let us assume that 
the 10 per cent thesis is correct. How then does this compare with non-EC 
fraud between economic actors, or fraud within or against a Member State? 
This will clearly depend on the context, the most dominant, yet implicit, 
context for interpretation being some idea about the usual level of fraud in 
similar situations of subsidies and levies, and this will normally be the 
overall level of fraud at the national level.
The tacit assumption is that fraud against the Community occurs on a 
bigger scale than fraud against Member States. Implicit causal hypotheses 
as to why this is the case range from the bad quality of EC regulation, the 
low level of EC law enforcement by national officials of EC-regulation as 
compared to the enforcement of national regulations, to the lower level of 
moral and social discipline of the citizens and the economic actors with 
regard to EC affairs as opposed to national and regional affairs.
If there are subjective, implicit comparisons involved in labelling a 
problem big or small, something similar applies to affirming or denying the 
plausibility of estimates of the extent of the problem. Empirical evidence 




























































































with respect to claims as to the overall extent of fraud there is ample 
opportunity for non-scientific motives to lend additional support to some 
conclusion or other. The use of political tactics in making predictions is 
well established in football, political elections and economic forecasting; 
depending on whether a more gloomy or a more optimistic presentation of 
the hidden ‘real’, rational prediction will have the desired effect, one 
colours estimates darker or lighter. One phenomenon in this field is so well 
established that it has been labelled; ‘self-fulfilling prediction’. Similarly, 
in making estimates as to the overall extent of fraud, not everybody is 
served equally well by advancing a certain estimate or by subscribing to 
one at all. “Not agreeing on the scale of the problem is one obstacle 
preventing a clamp-down on the fraudsters” (Tutt, 1989, p. 100). Vice 
versa: “Thus, up to the present, speculations about the extent of financial 
damages have become mainly a means and pretense for promoting reform 
desires concerning both the organization of authorities and agencies and 
current legislation” (Tiedemann, 1985a, p. 100). A more subtle example of 
the relationship between interests, belief and action can be found in the 
words of Lord MacLehose of Beoch: “Following on what Lord Bledisloe 
said, that detection is the best prevention, one is in a vicious circle because 
detection is a matter of commitment of resources. People will not commit 
resources until they are convinced there is a problem and without quantifi­
cation you cannot say whether a problem really exists or how much is 
worth spending on it” (House of Lords 1989, p. 91).7 Generally speaking, 
an answer, even an uncertain answer, to the question of the extent of EC 
fraud has multiple functions:
-  having an answer means one does hot have to look for one;
-  a high estimate, or at least an estimate that is not negligible, means that 
one can put pressure on political, policy and law enforcement officials 
to do something about it;
-  a relatively low estimate means one does not have to worry about it;
-  a scientifically approved estimate means that it can be treated as a fact;
-  the unfounded character of an estimate means one can either play the 
number down, or, conversely, postulate that the actual amount may be 
much higher, or, more rationally, that one needs further research in order 
to obtain the right figure.
This brief analysis does not attempt to uncover which of these motives 
corresponds to public statements of belief made by the various parties in the 
fraud debate, first because it is hard to bring forward evidence for secret 
motives and tactics, and secondly, because it is part of the same tactics to 




























































































assume that a variety of political and policy interests are at stake in making 
statements about the overall extent of fraud.
Action to safeguard the various interests of the European Community 
does not demand the same response to fraud. To protect fair competition it 
is necessary to keep fraud at a low level as long as competition is not 
distorted, whereas the maintenance of political credibility only requires 
visible attempts to reduce it, or even prevent knowledge about dark 
numbers from coming to light. Politicians and policy-makers are likely to 
have mixed feelings about the possibility of knowing more about the real 
level of fraud. First of all, if the figures revealed by dark-number research 
are several times greater than the current figures for registered fraud, it will 
look as if there has been a sudden boom in fraud. On the other hand, a 
proven high number for fraud will be ammunition for action to obtain funds 
for change, but will at the same time imply a duty to substantially reduce 
it. If the amount of fraud turns out to be less than expected, then the 
European fraud fighters at the national and European level cannot easily be 
accused of doing a bad preventive or repressive job. Finally, whether the 
amount found is big or small, the margins for politically manoeuvring over 
the estimates will decrease.
Section 2 summarizes the known facts about fraud against the European 
Community, and assesses what a ‘rational person’, that is, someone led by 
objective evidence and reasoning rather than by personal or political 
interest, should believe, in particular whether the 10 per cent claim or some 
higher or lower estimate is most likely to be true (section 2.2). Furthermore 
I examine whether knowledge about dark numbers is part of the Commis­
sion’s legal or political responsibility in fighting fraud (section 3.1), and 
whether it should be so (sections 3.2 and 3.3).
2. The Cases: Facts and Beliefs
2.1 The Known: Some Examples and Statistics
Cases of fraud against the European Community are not very open to 
inspection. Information is available through the news media on EC fraud 
cases, and in principle one can check on the cases that come before a 
national court or the European Court of Justice. Then there are a variety of 
official communications that cover fraud cases such as the annual progress 
reports of the Commission on the fight against fraud, regular reports from 
the European Court of Auditors, and irregular observations from institutions 




























































































parliaments. These different sources yield information on cases such as the 
following:
The largest single documented fraud case involved 12.3 million [pounds sterling] of 
export refunds for beef declared for export to Egypt but shipped to Brazil from le 
Havre. The EC offers no refunds for exports to Brazil because it is a major producer 
of beef and doesn’t need subsidised imports. Along with the US and Japan it receives 
a nil rate export refund. Highest rates of subsidy in 1988 were Western Africa at 1.50 
[pounds] a kilo and Northern Africa at 1.60 pounds. Middle East Gulf states also 
qualified for over 1 [pound] in refunds per kilo. International traders took advantage 
of short-term demand to take up the EC funds. (Tutt, 1989, p. 103)
A second example gives a taste of what EC fraud consists of, and also of 
the problems of proof and the delicate relationship between the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the Member States.
An inquiry was carried out following allegations by a Member of the European 
Parliament that the Dutch autorities had bought butter into intervention between 1982 
and 1987 which had been manufactured from sweet cream, a practice which is illegal. 
Following preliminary discussions with the national authorities, six creameries were 
selected for inspection, with the chief aim of examining documents relating to 
production and the purchase of raw materials. The Commission is awaiting further 
information before making known its findings about the arrangements for on-the-spot 
inspections and the quality of butter bought into intervention by the national 
authorities. (Commission, 1990, p. 12)
If things go according to the book, the official cases are reported by the 
national governments to Brussels.8 Just a few cases show up in the reports 
of UCLAF or DG VI (the agriculture directorate). In principle all cases find 
their way into the IRENE database.9
From the known cases one can infer methods or structural similarities in 
EC fraud cases. We will briefly describe export subvention fraud as the 
paradigm for EC-fraud. Harding describes three categories of techniques 
used:
(1) The export of actual goods, but of a kind not in fact entitled to a subsidy 
(falsification of the description or the origin of the goods); (2) dealings in actual 
goods, but a fictitious export in order to obtain a subsidy (falsification of the 
destination of the goods or the use of fictitious consignees); (3) the export of 
fictitious goods which exist on paper only. (1982, pp. 251-2)






























































































Schematic Examples o f Fraud Against the Budget o f the European Community
a) Re-export fraud
EC Rest of the World
Day 1
Day 2 <— 
Day 3
Beef exported —» 
for export refund 
Exported beef 
secretly returns 
Beef re-exported -> 
for second subsidy
This fraud relies on meat being secretly brought back within EC borders without 
Customs being aware of it. Instead of legally receiving one export refund, it 
illegally receives two subsidies, even more if the meat is re-exported again.
b) Carousel fraud 
Day 1
Day 2 <—
Best beef exported —» 
for high rate subsidy 
Beef imported as offal 
and low duties
This fraud relies on Customs not checking the quality of meat being exported or 
imported at borders. The first export of beef is perfectly legal. But the import of 
the same consignment disguised as offal attracts lower duties than if it was 
imported as best beef.
c) Destination fraud 
The lie for authorities: 
The true story:
Beef exported to Africa —> 
for high subsidies 
Beef exported to South —» 
America for low subsidies
This fraud relies on Customs and payment authorities not checking the ultimate 
destination of the meat consignment. Because the beef is stated as going to Africa, 
it receives a higher rate of subsidy. In fact it went to South America, where it 
should receive only a small subsidy or none at all.




















































































































vocsr^ONoqsoooNOOcot";Q'doddfnt^ooosdop’HvoCNTf —• w w (N '~' t"- ''"' CN '—'(N
- ' O n  —  r -  oo
o h v i ' q o o h q o ;  o n  —.  c s
S^5 C S d 'd 'S o l ^C-C-
*— —  oo
- -  on  t - ;  —. c o  in  in  «—<; o  s q  c s
8 ^ 2  S S b S g j  S 2  cS
r" — o n n - N N -  -  o ■<+ 
r -  co -  N  —  tj- oo so 
—  cs —
Tt m so o  so o  tJ-
t~- >n —  o  oo *-; *-; co <s
cs o  o  o  co cs’ oi o ’ —
s o o m o o - ^ m o O T t o c n  in
cs <n cS so m  —  i n oo- h co
O n CS 0 0
=  =  £
minTtoor-r^vooTtooN 
CN -3; —I OS SO -  00 r -ON -« — cS
r f  co —
—i so’ O









= 1 •S 2 
1 I  
S-s
1 1















































































































































The statistics for the period 1971-1991 reveal a few hundred cases reported 
per year (see Table 2). These are very unevenly distributed over the years 
and across countries, yet we see the numbers as well as the value of the 
domains concerned increase steadily since the early 1970s. Italy stands out, 
not so much for the number of cases reported, but in terms of the amounts 
involved. It is responsible for approximately two-thirds of total fraud value 
in the period 1986-1991. If one consults the appendices of the progress 
reports, it appears that the frauds have occurred basically in the sectors ‘oils 
and fats’ and ‘fruits and vegetables’.10 Germany ranks second, being 
strong in ‘beef and veal’ and ‘milk products’.
The greatest numbers of irregularities so far were recorded in 1990, 
accounting for 138 million ECU; with an overall expenditure on EAGGF 
of 30,000 million ECU, equivalent to 0.46 per cent of this part of the 
budget. This figure is far removed from the 10 per cent claim, but there is 
ample reason to think that not all irregularities are detected or reported to 
the Commission (see below).
Recent statistics for larger fraud cases (over 10,000 ECU) are also 
available from the traditional own resources, customs duties and agricultural 
levies, since Regulation 1552/89 came into force. The two years reported 
so far (1990 and 1991) give the impression that the income side is a worthy 
counterpart of the expenditure side. In 1990 around 400 cases were reported 
by the Member States, for a total of 90 million ECU and averaging 225,000 
ECU (Commission, 1992).11 Since the total own resources in 1990 
amounted to around 13,000 million ECU, the percentage of reported 
irregularities and fraud amounted to around 0.7 per cent of this part of the 
Community’s budget. Again, this is a minimum level set by officially 
reported cases. The actual number of frauds is bound to be higher. The 
question is, how much higher?
2.2 What is Not Known: Selective Mechanisms and Inconclusive Scientific 
Research
Selective mechanisms in detecting and reporting
Overall, the absolute numbers of the statistics are hard to interpret, 
particularly as regards the differences that show up between the number of 
cases over the years or between countries or domain or between the varying 
amounts involved. These may reflect real differences in the extent of fraud, 
resulting from different economic structures in the individual countries 
agricultural production sector, or may primarily be the result of the selective 
operations of the national or regional law enforcement agencies. This 




























































































Commission: “ In the Commission’s view, this [rise in number of cases 
reported] does not reflect an increase in the incidence of fraud, but an 
improvement in the systems operated by the Member States for detecting 
and reporting cases of fraud” (Commission, 1989, p. 10). In fact, this 
suggested ‘explanation’ for increasing figures might apply to decreasing 
figures, that also appear in Table 2 for EAGGF-Guarantee (e.g. the decrease 
from 1990 to 1991). However, without more data on the level of law 
enforcement efforts (quality, intensity), and economic activity (intensity, 
relative attractiveness of fraud), there is no way of telling whether the 
explanation holds water. No systematic effort has yet been made to bring 
to bear this relevant background knowledge for interpreting the available 
statistics.
There are several other reasons for not taking the figures at face value. 
First, there is the selective mechanism of reporting to the Commission. It 
has long been recognized that the existing reporting system between the 
Member States and the Commission leaves much to be desired (see, for 
example Tiedemann, in House of Lords, p. 92), and this may partially 
explain the discrepancy between registered cases and dark numbers. 
Another reason is the selective processes involved in detecting and 
following up fraud cases. Some national agencies simply have more 
capacity or more motivation to detect fraud cases than others. Once 
suspected or detected, other well known selective processes take place in 
terms of follow up, obtaining more evidence, prosecution or conviction. 
One can safely assume that all these selective mechanisms apply to fraud 
cases, even more than to classical crimes, since fraud cases are particularly 
labour intensive for law enforcement officials, and follow up may not meet 
with unlimited enthusiasm on the part of national agencies.
Even if the number of registered cases of EC fraud is not a fair 
representation of the actual number of cases, registered cases may be 
characteristic of unregistered fraud as regards who commits fraud, the 
fraudulent methods used, the regulations or the authorities being defrauded, 
the average amounts involved and the regulations or domains most often 
affected. The Court of Auditors and the Commission do indeed generate 
statistics on the basis of registered cases from time to time, but in my 
opinion the value of such calculations is offset by the lack of knowledge as 
to the criteria of data selection, and the description of fraudulent cases may 
be as much a description of the (selective) operation of law enforcement 
agencies as of the characteristics of fraudulent persons and companies. If 
IRENE, the databank containing the few thousand known cases of EC 
fraud, is to be fully exploited, then the quantified data on cases of fraud 
registered by Member States must be complemented by qualitative 




























































































is, it should cover among other things: the administrative or physical control 
method used; the number of fraudulent transactions or movements per 
domain as a percentage of total domain transactions; the policies followed 
in dealing with suspect cases; and the criteria for the selection and 
transmission of information, etc.
Scientific research
If official registrations fail to give a valid indication of the total amount of 
fraud against the EC budget, perhaps one can count on science to give a 
rational estimate. The most direct scientific evidence available on dark 
numbers in the Community is summed up in Tiedemann’s verbal testimony 
to the House of Lords.
The first point is that the German Minister of Finance has made an estimate of one 
per cent on the basis of what fiscal and custom authorities in Germany report. This 
figure does not cover subsidies administered by other German authorities, nor does 
it consider the whole dark field of national delinquency. The second point might be 
that the dark field of delinquency is considered to be particularly high by all 
continental criminologists as far as EC fraud is concerned. A third point which seems 
important to me is that wherever national authorities have conducted systematic a 
posteriori control checks at the branches of trade and production the percentage of 
discovered irregularities has mostly been very high; that is, between 10-30 % - and 
often included the whole branch checked. I may also mention the checks of the steel 
industries in the 1960s revealing that one third in that type of subsidised group was 
fictitious. The fourth point is the existing fraud reporting system in the EC: I think 
you all know that it does not really work and covers very few cases. The next point 
I am willing to explain afterwards is that interviews, the interview technique with 
“ insiders” , people working on transportation and so on, reveal that misuses in this 
field are widespread. Finally I want to say that experience with other types of 
economic crime, for instance, economic crime committed with and by the help of 
companies with limited responsibility in Germany and France, or delinquency in the 
building industry, or something which I have already mentioned, bankruptcy and 
insolvency, and experience with other reporting systems, I think justifies the 
conclusion that the EC budgets are subject to a considerable amount of irregularities, 
reaching at least several per cent. [...] Turkish trade statistics are going to be reduced 
for the last ten years by one third, because it has been detected and proved that one 
third of all exports from Turkey have been fictitious, to get export subsidies. [...] It 
[the Swedish study by Magnusson] was very much discussed (and also published in 
the newspapers) amongst scientists, criminologists and criminal lawyers, and it was 
finally agreed that in any case 30 per cent was clearly criminal. The rest, 20 per cent 
(up to the total of 50 per cent) being things like negligence or smaller cases. 
(Tiedemann, in House of Lords, pp. 88-9)
This looks like a lot of evidence. However, although the arguments lead to 




























































































refer in greater part to indicators for the prevalence of fraud that are rather 
indirect or inconclusive. Let me substantiate this by shortly reviewing the 
methods enumerated above taking into account statements and references 
to the subject from other occasions (see Tiedemann, 1985, p. 714; and 
Tiedemann, 1988, pp. 106-9). The first point, based on the German 
Minister’s statements refers to inferences from registered crime, and is thus 
not a direct indication of unregistered crime. The second argument, the 
collective assessment of dark numbers by criminologists, is either an 
authority argument that is not valid in itself unless backed by more direct 
evidence, or it is an expectation of a rate of crime based on an assessment 
of the opportunity for fraud with a large opportunity of fraud leading 
(presumably) to a large extent of fraud. The systematic research referred to 
by Delmas-Marty (Delmas-Marty, 1980; and Delmas-Marty and Roche-Pire, 
1982) deals with registered crime, although in using questionnaires to 
measure attitudes to EC regulation and the like, she illuminates the potential 
causes both of registered and unregistered crime. Thus, although one may 
describe these observations as a method to assess dark numbers based on 
the causes, the major value probably lies in establishing hypotheses for 
researching fraud and for indications where improvements in the policy, 
regulation, and control can lead to the prevention of fraud. Tiedemann’s 
third point seems to be based most directly on evidence, and qualifies as the 
most decisive ground for the rational assessment of dark numbers 
(discussed below). The technique of interviews with insiders, dealing with 
first-hand experiences of criminal actors, accomplices and eye witnesses, is 
highly illuminating, but as far as dark numbers is concerned, the method is 
basically explorative, giving rise to expectations of finding the crimes that 
are said to exist on a more universal or representative scale. At best, the 
scientific status is that of restricted local indirect evidence, and their best 
use is mainly to allow us to make hypotheses how, where, and by whom 
fraud is being committed. The last point concerns other types of economic 
crimes, and can be said to consist of an extrapolation or generalization 
from adjoining fields. If one checks the references, the EC steel industry is 
mentioned as a case in point, exemplifying that a third of total production 
is fraudulent.12 Other writers in different fields give different but generally 
high estimates. For example, Tiedemann mentions Liebl’s, “estimation of 
the dark number of bankruptcy offences amounting to about 80 per cent and 
the rate of unemployment caused by bankruptcy reaching per cent” 
(Tiedemann, 1985, p. 101; referring to Liebl, 1984). Useful as these 
estimates from adjoining fields may be, one is always stuck with the need 
to determine what the figures are really telling. Whether one is comfortable 
or uneasy about extrapolation, there is no rational procedure to determine 




























































































evidence (see Ruimschotel, 1989, pp. 126-8). The fact that EC fraud can be 
categorized as ‘economic crime’ does not guarantee sufficient similarity, 
particularly not of the simple descriptive kind. So again, there is no direct 
evidence on dark numbers from neighbouring fields of research. The ex-post 
modifications of Turkish trade figures (30%) can even be more safely 
disregarded, since the field is not only obscurely related to EC transactions, 
but they also relate to a non-EC country, a country that is held at arm’s 
length especially because it is not deemed to be sufficiently similar to join 
the EC in the near future.
Control sample research
For direct evidence we probably need to rely on the third method: a 
posteriori control checks. A closer examination of the claims made by 
Tiedemann (1984) and the available literature indicate that there has been 
little serious sample research to date. The Magnusson (1982) study on 
irregularities with import and export is one, and some empirical evidence 
comes from fraud with beefslaughter premiums in Germany. This last case 
concerned fraud with respect to a premium in Nordrhein-Westfalen in the 
mid-1960s context of ‘Brucellose-Tilgung’, that is the destruction of cattle 
because of tubercolosis. Apparently in more than 800 out of a total of 
35,000 cases it was found that ‘earmarks’ or ‘earmarkpapers’ of the cattle 
had been falsified, that is 2-3 per cent (see Tiedemann, 1974a, pp. 180ff). 
Another case mentioned by Tiedemann (1988, p. 107) is also supposed to 
have occurred in Nordrhein-Westfalen and also involving cattle. The fraud 
involved slaughter premiums in connection with tuberculosis.13 The 
newspaper in question reports that in the year 1975-1976 more than 1,000 
out of a sample of 10,000 were found to be fraudulent, that is, over 10 per 
cent. However, one cannot accept such figures as scientific evidence for 
rational overall estimates, firstly because the source is a newspaper (an 
admittedly reliable newspaper, but still), and, secondly and more important­
ly, because these are only two control investigations among hundreds of 
controls carried out in Europe. Among the existing reported and unreported 
cases the rate of fraudulent activity will range enormously and it does not 
count as good scientific practice to select one or two and declare these as 
conveying information for the whole (set of) domains.14
The Swedish research on import export fraud (Magnusson, 1982) defi­
nitely qualifies as an impressive scientific research effort. Unfortunately it 
does not bring us much further. The research was based on a control action 
of Swedish Customs. The investigation concerning imports is based on a 
random choice of trucks, boats and lorries in Stockholm, Goeteborg and 
Westerhose (Vasteras). Concerning export, a random choice of shippings on 




























































































in the cities mentioned have been investigated. The research and the control 
effort lasted a week. During that period a random choice of shippings on 
boats (for import) and trucks, boats and lorries (exports) was thoroughly 
investigated using physical and administrative controls. Estimates for the 
whole of Sweden were calculated for a year, both in terms of value and 
proportion of fraud in relation to the total number of transactions. The 
percentage estimates of cases where some kind of irregularity was involved 
(40 categories were distinguished!), differed from place to place with the 
lowest estimated percentage of 25 and the highest 50. Given the relatively 
small number of controls carried out, these estimates could well be wrong, 
with true percentages varying from 8 to 82.15 The value of the irregular­
ities ranged from circa 1 to 10 per cent of declared value. Consequently the 
estimate for financial loss in terms of unpaid taxation, the crucial percent­
age, should be in that range of 1 to 10 per cent as well, quite a far cry from 
the 50 per cent (overall cases) or 30 per cent (serious criminal cases) 
reported to the House of Lords as being a good indication of the scale of 
the phenomenon. The main statistics that summarize the research are 
included in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Estimates o f the Share in Percentage o f Movements Involving Irregularities 
and the Value o f these Irregularities as Percentages o f Declared Value*
Customs Irregularities Value Irregularities
% %
Point Interval Tax Irregu- Value Irregu-
Estimate Estimate larities larities
Vasberga 25 8 - 42 1 4
Norrastation 35 17 - 55 1 4
Solnaterminal 50 18 - 82 0.3 0.9
Vateras-harbour 33 0 - 66 2 8
Skandia-harbours
Import 33 14 - 52 0.4 3
Export 48 21 - 75 [0?]" 9
Source: Magnusson (1982).
* The percentages in the third column are 25 per cent of the figures in column 4, mirroring 
the taxation rate of 25 per cent; the percentage 0.4 for Import in the Skandia-harbours reflects 
a lower rate of about 10 per cent.




























































































This study indicates the likelihood of a great deal of illegal activity taking 
place in international transit, but 1 am afraid that the margins indicated by 
the research findings for the true value of dark numbers are so wide, that 
it is tantamount to saying that the exact percentages remain obscure.
In short, our review of the literature on fraud to find the most likely 
value of dark numbers has yielded some indirect evidence but only a few 
directly relevant research studies. Due to methodological limitations, they 
have only little evidential value. Unfortunate as this relative ignorance may 
be, it is better to acknowledge it than to perpetuate guesses as dogmas. But 
by now the “ 10 per cent fraud” hypothesis has gained credence among 
journalists, politicians and social scientists despite, or perhaps thanks to, 
lack of evidence. However, we cannot say with any reasonable degree of 
confidence how much fraud goes on. Before examining who, within the 
European Community, is responsible for knowledge or action with respect 
to fraud (see section 3.1), I will indicate how studies into the extent of the 
fraud problem are possible.
Recommended research: dark-number research in the context o f evaluating 
targeting
One may doubt whether dark-number studies can be undertaken at all. One 
member of the Court of Auditors phrased his misgivings thus:
All attempts to quantify the size of the agricultural fraud problem in the Community 
should be treated with extreme reserve. I regard this statement as axiomatic because, 
as has often been pointed out, the fraud problem in the Community (or indeed in any 
other walk of life) is essentially a problem of undetected fraud. There are some 
contexts where attempts to measure the unmeasurable, however suspect the results, 
serve some practical purpose, for example, when accountants try to determine a 
balance sheet value for such intangibles as good will or brand names. But trying to 
quantify the Community fraud problem is not such a case. Even if divine revelation 
were to disclose to us the true cost of fraud to the Community budget, that 
information by itself would be of little use to anyone unless it were supported by 
evidence as to how, why and where the fraud had arisen. (Carey 1990, p. 12)
This statement is constructive with respect to the need to know more about 
the qualitative aspects of fraud, that is, fraudulent methods, likely cases of 
fraud and the homogeneity of domains affected by fraud. However, Carey’s 
pessimism would appear to be scientifically unfounded. We have already 
cited several methods that yield (more) information as to the overall extent 
of the problem, ranging from extension of registered cases to interviewing 
(potential) committers of fraud or law enforcement officials or an analysis 
of a period of control effort (such as the Magnusson study). Indeed most 




























































































background of fraud cases, the personal or socio-economic conditions 
leading to it, and the imperfections in control procedures of law enforce­
ment systems that generate the opportunities to commit fraud.
The most direct and fruitful approach to obtain a dark number estimate 
in a specific area would be through control samples of financial transac­
tions. The two kinds of sample fraud research discussed above (the German 
slaughter premium studies and the Swedish import-export study) point in 
that direction, but the method can be refined and incorporated into the 
evaluation of normal control practices.16 The procedure is simple: in the 
course of fraud control in a certain area a number of investigations are 
usually carried out incorporating quite a number of cases. Unfortunately, the 
outcomes of these controls have only limited information value for the 
overall extent of fraud, due to a lack of information regarding the selection 
of control objects.17 The ‘sampling method’ used normaly is not at random 
(‘aselect’), but selective, targeted in order to increase the chances of picking 
out those persons and transactions where, upon closer scrutiny, some form 
of fraud is involved. So, if customs officials know or believe that big ships 
or ships coming from Panama are carriers of smuggled freight more often 
than other ships, the customs will tend to target these ships more often than 
others. In many domains some kind of targeting is part of the current 
practice albeit under different names such as ‘risk analysis’, ‘criminal 
profiles’ or ‘clues’ for the occurrence of crime.18 One should expect 
similar selective practices when reading reports of fraud investigations 
based on a sample of cases, for example a number of warehouses inspected 
by the Commission.
In the Community context, targeting is sometimes prescribed. Regulation 
4045/89 explicitly directs Member States “ to ensure that the selection of 
undertakings for scrutiny gives the best possible assurance of the effective­
ness of the measures for preventing and detecting irregularities under the 
system of financing by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF. Inter alia the 
selection shall take account of the financial importance of the undertakings 
in that system and other risk factors” (art. 2.1). The regulation describes 
how the control of large receipts or payments should occur more often than 
for smaller receipts, with the former ones being controlled at least 50 per 
cent of the cases. This is targeting for output maximalization, that is, 
minimalization of sums wrongly paid by the Commission or wrongly not 
received. Whereas these controls are basically a posteriori controls on 
payments through scrutiny of commercial documents, a sizeable portion of 
5 per cent of all goods presented for export refunds is to be the object of 
physical examination (Regulation 386/90).
To evaluate targeting we can compare the yield (and costs) of the 




























































































or with a procedure of non-selection, also referred to as aselect sampling. 
The latter is a much used and recommended procedure in scientific 
research, because (if executed correctly) the outcomes have a high 
probability of representing those of the whole population or domain (that 
is, all elements, be they persons or business activities, researched and not 
researched); the probability being higher the larger the sample.19 The, 
almost surprising, conclusion of this analysis is, that aselect sampling from 
time to time would not only give a good method of evaluating one’s current 
targeting, but it is also a proper -  if not the best -  way to indicate the 
overall extent of a certain practice (say fraud, or smuggling). So it can give 
the best estimates of the dark numbers of criminal or other activities.20
As far as I know, this kind of targeting evaluation combined with dark 
number estimates is not practised systematically.21 However, given the 
required number of controls for Member States, they should be relatively 
easy to reorganise giving them the double goal of ‘output maximalization’ 
and ‘information optimalization’. The current analysis also suggests that 
research into dark numbers does not have to come from external scientific 
parties, but can become part of rationalized control practices.
3. The Action: The Community’s Anti-Fraud Policy
3.1 Responsibility for Action Against Fraud: 111 Allocated and Clearly 
Defined?
Legal responsibility and policy responsibility
Who is responsible for the extent of fraud against the EC budget? That is, 
whose duty is it to act against fraud, and who has a legal obligation to 
know when and where it occurs? At face value the answer is ‘nobody’, 
since the term ‘fraud’ occurs nowhere in legal texts defining the 
competences and responsibilities of the various EC institutions. Yet, there 
are legally defined duties that imply a concern with fraud in terms of 
action. Art. 5 of the Treaty, in particular, states that “ Member States shall 
take all appropriate measures whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty, or resulting from 
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Community tasks” . This clearly indicates a duty on the 
part of the Member States to see to it that the Council regulations laying 
down the policies of the Community are not being undermined by fraudu­
lent actions. This implies that the Commission, as the guardian of the 




























































































duty to see to it that the Member States properly enforce Community 
legislation (Noel, 1991). The Court of Auditors, which has only recently 
become a formal institution of the Community,22 has an obvious role given 
its mandate to examine all EC revenue and expenditure, in all Member 
States and in third countries receiving Community funds, administratively 
and physically, for legality, regularity and sound financial management.23 
The European Parliament, through its role in the discharge procedure vis a 
vis the Commission for the annual implementation of the general budget, 
is able to comment on the way fraud at the expense of the Community 
budget, is dealt with. The Treaty of Rome did not include an autonomous 
right to create and apply sanctions for infringing Community regulations and 
the new Treaty does not include one either.24 This means that, both under 
the interpretion of the old Treaty and the freshly codified new Treaty, the 
basic situation for the legal division of powers stands as follows: the 
Community, in the form of the Council of Ministers, decides the policies 
and the regulations that can be defrauded; the Parliament controls 
expenditure; the Commission prepares, implements and executes the policies 
to be enforced; and the Member States, apart from further implementation 
of the policies, are responsible for the overall law enforcement, detection, 
prosecution and sanctioning of abuses. This situation, typical for many areas 
of EC policy, is sometimes labelled as a ‘competence dilemma’ for the 
Commission, but the expression ‘competence-interest conflict’ covers the 
situation better, both for the Commission and the Member States; the 
Commission does not have the complete competence (of control and 
sanctions) over an area wherein its interests lie, and the Member States have 
a competence (of control and sanctions) but, apart from fulfilling a duty, they 
do not have the real interests to exert this competence.
Responsibility is not only couched in legal terms or best conceived in a 
legal perspective, since legal responsibility is sometimes not sufficient or 
necessary to be effective. It is equally important to look at the way in which 
the parties concerned perceive their own and others’ responsibilities. Because 
of their own definition of responsibility, some countries may (be willing to) 
go further in the fight against fraud than is legally prescribed, whilst others 
do not even come close to delivering what is legally required of them. The 
same applies to the institutional partners: the Parliament and the European 
Court of Auditors have always seen it as part of their task to keep an eye 
on the extent of fraud against the Community, being both in line with the 
responsibility that comes within their legal mandate and stretching it a bit. 
The Court of Auditors conceives of its own task strategically (‘systems 
audit’), so that it is as much part of their job to criticize opportunities for, 
or likely causes of, fraud as actual or suspected cases.25 Responsibilities 




























































































organisational priorities. Thus, the Commission has taken upon itself a 
greater responsibility than it used to do, partly under pressure from the 
European Parliament. Thus, responsibility is also a psychological and 
political reality that does not necessarily correspond to the legal situation. 
The fact that trader or farmer unions officially represent their members’ 
interests does not mean that they should not have an interest in reducing 
fraud among their members. We will refer to the organisational commitment 
that follows from political, psychological and moral responsibilities as ‘policy 
responsibility’.
Legal and other responsibilities interact, and yesterday’s moral 
responsibility may be tomorrow’s legal responsibility. It is fair to say that 
in general formal organizations try to harmonize the triad ‘legal responsibil­
ity’, ‘policy responsibility’ and ‘economic or power interest’.26 For example, 
the Commission has tried to compensate the drawbacks that stem from the 
fundamental competence-interest conflict. Basically it has strived for a major 
(and obtained some) increase of its direct and indirect control powers by 
having the Council accept regulations that include the right to carry out 
independent or cooperative controls in Member States. It has also pushed 
for and obtained more explicit supervisory powers by imposing the duty on 
Member States to report not only the cases of fraud in a certain area (usually 
called ‘irregularities’), but also to provide other additional information. Thus, 
national law enforcement systems are put under pressure when we look at 
the most recent EC legislation that can be described alternatively as 
‘operationalizing’ their law enforcement obligations or diminishing their 
overall responsibility. When new EC regulations are being formulated, they 
incorporate increasing powers for the Commission in the area of information 
gathering, autonomous controls in the Member States, joint controls and 
thereby an increase of evaluation possibilities of Member States law 
enforcement activities. Thus, under Regulation 595/91 the Member States 
will provide the Commission with detailed information on detected cases 
of irregularity under EAGGF-Guarantee, whereas even in the field of VAT, 
predominantly a Member State’s income and concern, Regulation 1553/89 
(art. 12) requires Member States to provide the Commission with yearly 
reports on the ways in which national agencies collect taxes. Moreover, 
Member States have increasingly taken on more operational duties to carry 
out controls, such as under Regulation 4045/89 for EAGGF-Guarantee and, 
especially, Regulation 386/90, requiring that 5 per cent of all goods presented 
for export control undergo physical inspection. Regulation 307/91 provides 
for reinforcement of monitoring expenditure chargeable to EAGGF-Guarantee 
Section in a number or high risk areas, for example wine, fruit and 




























































































The Court of Justice plays an active role in bringing legal competence, 
policy ambition and the own interests of the Community (represented by the 
Commission) into line. Thus, in Case 68/88 (Commission v. Greece), it 
elaborated art. 5 into a Member State duty to protect the financial interests 
of the EC in a manner that is equal to the care of national interests, 
proportionate, and effective.27 If this means that Member States have the 
duty to exert some minimal diligence and severity, then it also affirms a right 
on the part of the Commission to monitor whether the Member States 
comply, and to bring the latter before the European Court of Justice, if the 
Commission observes or believes them to be negligent in doing so. Thus, 
wittingly or unwittingly, the Court contributes to a dynamic power play.28 
The policy responsibility the Commission felt was ‘legalized’ by the Court, 
or, as the Commission would like to put it, the underlying legal principles 
of proportionality and effectiveness were confirmed. The consequences of 
this subtle shift in the relation between the Commission and the Member 
States are interesting to observe. The Commission seemed delighted with 
the decision and conveyed the message to the Member States in the form 
of a letter of the President to the Heads of State, in case they had not 
realized its implications yet. This letter, formulated as a question to the 
Member States as to whether their law enforcement systems complied with 
the criteria outlined by the Court, can be regarded as a first overall test to 
monitor the criteria outlined by the Court. From the reassuring answers 
received (Commission, 1992, p. 70), one is led to believe that, at least 
officially, all is well.
The dynamics are continuous. It is likely that the Commission realized 
that the interpretation of an article in the Maastricht Treaty is not as good 
as an article in the Treaty itself, and has therefore taken steps to formalize 
the duty of Member States and the legitimization of the Commission’s right 
of supervision. Indeed, the principle of assimilation, first recognized by the 
Court as an implicit principle of law, is now an explicit principle of 
analogous treatment enshrined in the Treaty on European Union.29 30
Thus, although many parties have a legal or policy duty to expose or 
prevent fraud, none seems to have an explicit duty to be informed on the 
subject. However, I shall argue that the duty exists by implication.
Operational criteria for national anti-fraud law enforcement
The crucial lines of the decision of the Court in Case 86/88 are as follows:
Article 5 of the Treaty requires Member States to take all measures necessary to 
guarantee the application and effectiveness o f Community law. For that purpose, whilst 
the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure in particular 
that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural 




























































































law of similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Moreover, the national authorities must 
proceed, with respect to infringements o f Community law, with the same diligence as 
that which they bring to bear in implementing corresponding national laws.31
But how far exactly does the Member States’ duty stretch, and to what extent 
has the Commission the right to monitor the proper implementation of 
policies laid down in regulations? This question is automatically solved when 
the duty to perform and the right to monitor is explicated as part of the 
regulations in the various fields as in the examples given above. But, as the 
Court of Justice says, the duty and right relationship can be upheld even if 
nothing is spelled out in a particular regulation. This general legal supervi­
sion right of the Commission (at the same time a policy if not legal duty) 
can be based on the fundamental guardianship of the Commission that under­
lies the EEC Treaty, and can therefore be said to have existed since the 
Treaty came into force. Yet this right is very much operationalized by the 
oft-cited 68/88 decision. Let me comment on the various criteria, explicated 
in the Court’s decision, to judge to application of Community law, of which 
I can discern four: ‘analogous to national’, ‘same diligence’; ‘effectiveness 
of Community law’, ‘effective’; ‘proportionate’; and ‘dissuasive’.
A. Relevant criteria. The criterion that a penalty be ‘dissuasive’ would appear 
redundant: a penalty is effective because it is dissuasive. ‘Proportionality’ 
is probably an independent criterion, often advocated within a criminal law 
system, partly because it is judged (by law makers, the judiciary and the 
general public) to be the right measure of some ‘retributive’ conception of 
justice and punishment (in contrast to a more goal-oriented conception of 
punishment), partly because proportional sanctions are deemed to be more 
effective (or dissuasive) than non-proportional sanctions. So the criterion 
cannot be entirely subsumed under effectiveness.
The ‘same diligence’ criterion (assimilation or analogy principle) is hailed 
as an important step forward for the Community,32 probably because the 
actual situation in some Member States in some domains did not meet this 
requirement. But the criterion cannot be but a minimum. In cases where 
countries do not protect their own interests very well, similar treatment 
would simply mean reaching the same imperfect level.33 If this were a 
sufficient criterion, it could be used by Member States to argue against an 
effective enforcement of Community regulation since they not even require 
such a high level of protection of themselves; if it suffices to be equal, then 
effectiveness and proportionality are redundant. This clearly cannot be the 
case, and would, moreover, be contrary to the intention and the wording of 




























































































‘effective’ and ‘proportionate’ should help to complement the assimilation 
criterion to reach an acceptable degree of law enforcement in case of EC 
policies. Furthermore, similarity, being the comparative minimum criterion, 
should not be assumed to introduce dimensions other than those explicitly 
mentioned. Hence ‘similarity’ should be interpreted as ‘equally effective and 
equally proportionate’.
The criterion ‘effective’ implies a more or less serious or extended look 
at the system at hand, depending on what is meant by ‘effective’. If one 
means ‘potentially effective’, one can be content with assessing the number 
of controls, the kind of sanctions and the corresponding maximum penal­
ties,34 but then this criterion is close if not similar to the criterion of 
proportionality. Thus, one must interpret ‘effective’ as ‘really effective’,35 
which, if taken seriously, would mean getting involved in substantial 
empirical (evaluation) research into the effects of law enforcement on fraud, 
including among other things, the long-standing and never fully resolved 
problem of the general preventive effect on potential offenders. This would 
imply that real controls and sanctions would have to be assessed and causally 
coupled to changes of criminal behaviour of those addressed by the norms. 
Even if the execution of this task would skip the causal connection problem, 
an assessment of ‘effectiveness’ would mean an assessment of the overall 
extent of fraud in all relevant areas of the Member States. In sum, effective 
law enforcement should decrease the overall extent of fraud, expressed as 
a decrease of dark numbers or, in an even less causal interpretation, in a 
general low level of infringements. If one wants to avoid measurement and 
causation problems, one can take ‘effective’ in the other conventional sense 
of ‘individual prevention’, which is operationally simpler to measure than 
effectiveness in a generally preventive sense. To be individually effective, 
is to persuade those found committing infringements not to repeat their 
illegal actions.
B. Relevant aspects. What sort of activities must Member States engage in 
to fulfil their obligations? The Court’s text speaks of “ taking all measures 
necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law” , 
“ infringements are penalized” and “must proceed with respect to infringe­
ments” , all referring, in short, to law enforcement. If one disregards 
transposition of European legislation into national laws, and policy 
implementation in the administrative sense, then law enforcement has broadly 
two aspects: control, including supervision, detection, and investigation; and 
sanctions, including prosecution, transactions, punishment and execution of 
punishment. The importance of the former as the primary, material phase 




























































































police officials, but easily forgotten or downplayed among legal scholars and 
judges.
The criteria ‘effective’, ‘proportionate’ and ‘equally effective and 
proportionate’ take on their specific meaning depending on whether they 
apply to the control or the sanction phase of law enforcement. Proportionality 
with respect to sanctions is relatively easily defined, since this is a traditional 
law making practice of having the (maximal) sanction proportional to the 
seriousness of the infringement. Seriousness is in turn is related to the 
interests harmed, the amount of fraud involved, the degree of trust betrayed 
and such like. Control-proportionality should be interpreted proportional to 
the things controlled, that is, the number of potential and actual infringe­
ments, the number of economic actors or actions supervised, the difficulty 
of controlling and so forth, that is, as the ‘problem-proportionality’ of 
control: control efforts should be proportional to the size of the problem of 
potential infringements. Sanction-proportionality can be operationally 
conceived as ‘proportional to seriousness’.
As discussed above, effectiveness of sanctions actually consists in an 
impact that reduces the overall level of infringements to an acceptable level. 
But since this would raise enormous problems of general measurement and 
causal inference, one can settle for an operational definition of ‘individual 
prevention’; sanctions that are applied should be de facto dissuasive to those 
who infringe. Effectiveness of control appears more difficult to define, but 
assuming that not all actions in a certain domain are subject to control, it 
should ideally succeed in identifying those elements among all financial 
transactions that merit closer scrutiny. This is nothing other than the 
effectiveness of intelligent targeting, as encountered before.
So, in specifying the criteria developed by the Court of Justice the problem 
of the extent of infringements, as measured by dark number studies, has 
emerged as the foundation for ‘problem-proportionality’ and the success of 
targeting has proved to be the operationalization of ‘effectiveness of control’.
C. National or international standards. Do not the criteria state too littlel 
Does not the idea of having a Community and common policies imply that 
policy regulations are being implemented and controlled in a similar manner 
in all Member States? Such interpretation would demand, not intra-State 
assimilation, but inter-State assimilation. The latter should not mean literal 
equivalence (for example the same number of control personnel), or even 
proportional equivalence (control capacity equivalent to the number of 
persons in a country or the number of economic transactions), but functional 
equivalence; that is, roughly the same control density or preventive effect. 
The question is whether such a criterion can be upheld as an EC principle 




























































































to the higher? Or all to the standards of the law enforcement system which 
represents some empirical or normative average? In any case, it is not clear 
that there is a criterion here, and if there is one, it is not clear what it is. The 
problems of applicability and comparison of cases can be circumvented by 
applying the absolute criteria of effectiveness and proportionality to Member 
States’ law implementation efforts; if these efforts are reasonably proportion­
al and effective, then they should also be relatively similar.
To turn to another aspect of the international dimension, art. 5 of the 
Treaty expects Member States to cooperate internationally to combat 
infringements such as fraud against the Community budget “by taking all 
measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of 
Community law” . This duty to cooperate can be specified in terms of the 
Court’s criteria and operationalized in a similar way as has already been done 
before. This would mean that ‘problem-proportionality’ implies, among other 
things, to engage in information exchange and coordinated action to the 
degree needed by the international character of the fraud. This degree, as 
appears from all investigations, is high, and the duty to collaborate 
internationally is correspondingly high.36 To collaborate internationally up 
to the standard of ‘proportionality of sanctions to crime seriousness’ would 
then appear to mean an obligation among Member States, if not to harmonize 
definitions of crime, sanction modalities and (potential) penalties involved, 
then at least to render these elements somewhat consistent, or not too widely 
divergent. Control-effectiveness, the third criterion, means that the 
cooperation, required under ‘problem proportionality’, should be effective. 
One of the best ways to ensure joint effectiveness is to let controls of all 
Member States complement one another and to share operational information 
and tactical intelligence, which will in turn lead to improved targeting. 
Lastly, the criterion of internationally effective sanctions incorporates the 
duty of Member States to cooperate in catching those committing fraud, 
bringing them to court, passing judgement, applying a sanction, and the 
execution of any such sanction. Often this type of international cooperation 
is subject to international conventions that include specific obligations. My 
argument contends that under the general provisions of the EC Treaty, 
Member States are obliged to cooperate internationally on all four aspects, 
and it would not be hard to argue that notions of rational, fair governmental 
behaviour imply the same criteria, functioning as prime indicators of the 





























































































Criteria for Evaluating Law Enforcement Systems in a National and International 
Context, Specified for the Phases of Control and Sanctions, with Special Emphasis 
on the Role of the Extent of the Problem, Dark Numbers (italics)
Criteria Minimal Intra-State Inter-State Minimal














X X X? X
- depends on the nature and extent of the problem, 
seriousness, social values
- to be measured in particular by aselect (representative) control 
samples
X X X? X
- depends on intelligent use of knowledge of 
(representative) fraud cases compared to non-fraud cases
- to be measured by comparing targeting/select control with aselect 
control
X X X? X
- depends on the seriousness of the problem, damage, 
violation of social values
- to be assessed a priori; not dependent on the extent of the
problem (unless the extent determines the seriousness)
X X X? X
- to be measured by individual recidivism
- to be measured by aselect (representative) control samples
D. Procedure. Concomitantly to different conceptions of the content of the 
criteria put forward by the Court, one should raise more procedural questions 
concerning supervisionary and complaint rights; that is to say, who can or 
should be able to initiate a procedure against whom before which fomm? 
What kinds of outcomes are conceivable? What kinds of sanctions are 
possible or should be possible? The strong interpretation given above lists 
a varied sef of duties on the part of Member States. Corresponding rights 
should exist to evaluate whether they are met, to bring complaints and to 
judge in the matter. The current procedures provided by the Rome and 
Maastricht Treaties give various forms of complaint action (infringements, 
art. 169, 170; action for annulment, art. 173, action against failure to act, 




























































































Parliament, Private Parties) against either a Member State (infringement), 
the Commission (annulment, failure to act), or the Council (annulment, 
failure to act) (see e.g. Koppen, 1992). My concern here is not with 
procedure, but with the content of enforceable quality criteria, and its 
implications for knowing and acting. From the operational criteria it appears 
that some evaluation and research into the Member States’ control and 
sanction operations are necessary, so corresponding rights of this kind of 
extended supervision should be assumed to exist. Again this information-duty 
and right is subject of a number of Regulations, but my argument is that it 
is general.
All complaint procedures are brought before the Court of Justice, but it 
is questionable whether the Court of Justice it the best qualified body to 
decide on the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the criteria it helped to spell 
out. In a way, lawyers are not best suited to judge general matters of fact. 
I can well imagine that the more material task of assessing whether Member 
States law enforcement systems are ‘really effective’ or ‘similar in practice’ 
should be relegated to the European Court of Auditors. This task would be 
an extension of the European Court of Auditors’ current ‘systems audit’ 
practices and would also be in line with the conception of the work of 
national Courts of Audit, not only to assess the legality of financial 
transactions, but to assess the effectiveness of governmental expenditure. One 
can also envisage the Court of Justice taking on all kinds of cases, both 
formal and more material, if it is helped by evaluative reports coming from 
Member States, the Commission, the European Court of Auditors or any 
other (objective) assessment body.
3.2 The Commission’s Anti-fraud Policy: The Invisible Role of Dark 
Numbers
A departmental policy or work programme is typically the place where legal 
rights and obligations meet with political and material ambitions; it is as 
close to an operationalization of policy responsibility as one could ever get 
-  assuming there is no secret agenda. Originally, there was no EC policy 
for fraud control, since fraud or criminality combat is not a primary objective 
of the Community. Fraud is ‘created’ as a side effect of the Common 
Policies, or rather, of the regulations that explicate the policies. Fraud can 
thus be viewed as part of the costs of a certain policy (too much expenditure 
or income not collected), or as a set of (illegal) actions that prevent the 
optimal fulfilment of the primary policy goals. When fraud is widespread, 
the credibility of programmes and institutions bearing a responsibility for 




























































































What at first appears to be a side concern of a set of policies or a simple 
condition for operation, becomes a prime concern.37 The creation of 
UCLAF (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude) -  in response to 
criticism of the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors -  in 1988, 
and the adoption of its 45-item work programme in 1989 (approved by the 
Council and Parliament) constituted the Commission's response to fraud.
The original formulation and subsequent reformulation of the Commission 
objectives in the field of fraud (see Commission papers, 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990, 1991, 1992) show a great deal of continuity of content. There has, 
however, been a shift of terms especially about the axes on which UCLAF 
is presumed to work, and there are significant shifts of ‘spirit’; from the 
(still) defensive 1987 report to the more open and inspiring 1988 document, 
and the realistic yet optimistic ‘work in progress’ report for the year 1989. 
The report for the year 1990 is even more realistic, it keeps the optimistic 
upbeat, but the downbeat is that progress is still slow despite the increasing 
need for acceleration in view of the more complete realization of the Internal 
Market. Underlying the text is concern regarding the political will of the 
Member States to combat fraud against the European Community. The 1992 
report, for the year 1991, picks up again in spirit, as if the Commission is 
reassured that the measures already taken really add up to something that 
is lastingly effective.
Where then in this programme are observations as to the extent of fraud? 
The answer is, both everywhere and nowhere. Every page contains something 
on the fight against fraud, but the item itself is avoided. Similarly there is 
no overall assessment of the extent to which this fight has been successful. 
In the remainder of this section I will discuss several possible reasons for 
this failure to address the crux of fraud combat.
The material problems of combatting fraud are enormous. The progress 
report for 1989 reveals this better than the reports for 1990 and 1991. The 
work programme specifies the actions being taken and considered, whereas 
the regulations that came into force over the last few years (some of which 
were discussed in section 3.1) mark important steps in the ongoing effort 
to intensify and monitor the fight against fraud. A lot has still to be done. 
The major conclusions of the progress reports, although not formulated as 
such explicitly, are: (1) as soon as inspection by the Commission (UCLAF) 
in conjunction with national law enforcement authorities takes place, serious 
irregularities (fraud on the part of economic actors) are observed; (2) as soon 
as the national inspection systems are reviewed, serious shortcomings (on 
the part of law enforcing agencies) are observed; (3) some of the policy 
measures (for example subsidization, stimulation, promotion) do not appear 




























































































Similar findings emerge from audit enquiries reported by the European 
Court of Auditors (1988, 1992) which not only bring fraudulent cases to 
light, but also comment on the less than optimal performance of national 
law enforcement agencies. One of its latest recommendations is to establish 
a Community Anti-fraud Unit to tackle fraudulent operations in an 
international context (Court of Auditors, 1992, items 4.4-4.8). Like most of 
the Commission’s plans and actions, these suggestions can be interpreted 
as partial compensations for the void ‘created’ by the competence-interest 
conflict. Fighting fraud, so it seems from the perspective of the Commission, 
and, to some extent, of the European Parliament, is partially fighting the 
Member States; persuading or prescribing them to take fraud seriously, to 
give information, and to take minimal measures against it. It is also fighting 
for the Commission’s own inspection rights. Certain efforts by the 
Commission can, less polemically, be interpreted as a policy responsibility 
that aims at extending legal duties (on the part of the Member States) and 
rights (on the part of the Commission), to better guarantee the Community’s 
(political and financial) interests.
The 45 measures that make up the Commission’s anti-fraud policy are 
grouped around three axes: cooperation, prevention and combat. Prevention 
by simplifying legislation and improving controls (items 1-11) is probably 
the most direct way for the Commission to reduce -  via adoption in the 
Council and execution by the Member States -  the overall amount of fraud. 
Many measures to further cooperation are necessary precisely because of 
the division of responsibility, discussed before, where all concrete law 
enforcement efforts are made at the level of the Member State. Under 
‘combat’ or ‘counteraction’ we find those measures that either increase the 
harmonization of sanctions or increase the supervisory powers of the 
Commission. This means that to a large extent the Commission is not 
directly in touch with the phenomenon of fraud but only indirectly through 
the intermediary of Member States.
Even so, the issue of the extent of fraud could have been given a more 
conspicuous role had the axes used to draw up the work programme been 
slightly different, stimulating increased focus on the phenomenon. For 
example, the first anti-fraud document (Commission, 1987) talks about four 
stages: detection, investigation (effective reactions), follow-up and 
prevention, and the need to introduce cooperation as an explicit primary 
objective only came later. My own extended classification distinguishes 
analytically five areas of convergent or consecutive goals: detection, or how 
much fraud exists, which cases become known and registered and reported; 
assessment, or how much fraud should be assumed to take place (existence), 
how important or costly are the different types of fraud (relative harmful­




























































































reaction, or how to treat known cases of fraudulent action (negotiations, 
criminal or administrative prosecutions, punishments); prevention, or given 
certain policies, how to take measure to diminish fraudulent action towards 
EC measures either by changing measures, their implementation or 
enforcement (detection or reaction); andfeedback or follow up, that is, how 
to use the information gathered in the process of detection, reaction or 
prevention, to evaluate and improve the material policies themselves, or to 
improve the policies of implementation or law enforcement (detection, 
reaction or prevention).
This slightly more sophisticated classification would make it easer to 
recognize the problem of dark numbers as part of the work programme. 
Under the earlier (1987) classification it would have come in as a crucial 
element under ‘detection’, and in my extended version it would fall 
completely under ‘assessment’. But in either case the dimensions are very 
much interrelated, both conceptually {a priori) and empirically. Detection 
is probably the most useful form of either combat or prevention. Similarly, 
it is difficult to evaluate the success of detection, or reaction or prevention 
without assessment of the increase or decrease of actual fraud cases, that 
is, without having some idea of actual numbers, numbers that are currently 
dark numbers. Finally, cooperation is not a goal in itself, but is only 
meaningful with respect to the other dimensions.
The proper execution of the claimed functions certainly relies on 
cooperation and firm action, but all kinds of knowledge is helpful if not 
absolutely necessary. For prevention and combat it is useful to know what 
stimulates fraud; causes may be socio-economic, policy-related or inherent 
in the implementation or law enforcement stages. Similarly, for prevention, 
or combat, it is helpful to have some sort of prediction that tells where fraud 
is likely to be most serious or expected to increase or decrease, and which 
will cover differenty kinds of descriptive, explanatory and predictive 
knowledge. This is true in general and dark-number research fulfils many 
of the intellectual tasks just outlined. Let me sum up the reasons why the 
Commission, and the Member States, sooner or later will have to concentrate 
on dark number research: 1
(1) delineation o f tasks and assessment of control needs: it is important to 
know the extent of the problem of fraud, its diversity, its increase or 
decrease. This knowledge can only partially be obtained from a descriptive 
evaluation of known cases, such as those incorporated in the IRENE 
database. Dark number assessment is also crucial to estimate the need for 
control efforts required under the proportionality criterion;
(2) explanation of representative cases: the discovery and testing of causes 




























































































representation of all the cases (whether registered or not). The registered 
cases in IRENE can only function as exploratory cases;
(3) wider explanation-analysis or feedback: dark-number research, as comple­
mentary to known cases analysis can, properly executed by taking into 
account the wider context of fraud, act as a source for suggesting ways of 
improvement of policies with respect to regulation, implementation, control, 
detection or sanctioning. In this way dark number research overlaps with 
evaluative research and it is the empirical complementary of systems auditing 
as practised by the Court of Auditors;
(4) more effective combat and prevention: increasing sophistication with 
respect to the first three points (where fraud occurs and why) will lead to 
corresponding sophistication in prevention and combat;
(5) evaluation of the effectiveness of combat and prevention: it is almost 
impossible to measure or monitor the effect of measurements taken in the 
context of combat or prevention with respect to regulation, implementation, 
control, detection or sanctioning without occasional measurement or estimates 
of dark numbers; such assessment would constitute an assessment of one 
of the prime criteria to judge national law enforcement efforts, as required 
by the EEC Treaty and the interpretation of the Court of Justice.
4. Evaluation of Non-Action; Good Reasons and False Arguments
In sum, there are good if not imperative reasons to pay attention to dark 
number assessment. Why then is this issue of the overall extent of fraud not 
taken up? One possible reason is that such research is deemed impossible. 
This argument of technical-scientific impossibility has been met by listing 
a number of possible lines of investigation, the most promising of which is 
control sample research and analysis.
A second reason not to engage in such research is that knowledge 
revealing the true extent of fraud would be useless, since the capacity of the 
various national agencies to control, investigate, prosecute or pass sentence 
is limited in terms of personnel, time, financial and other resources. This 
argument is valid, albeit to a limit extent. After all, dark number analysis 
could yield information about whether there are good reasons to change the 
overall capacity, or to reallocate the various sub-capacities within the total 
capacity, and such allocation corresponding to the extent of the problem is 
required from Member States under the proportionality criterion. Since such 
assessment would probably provide insight into methods of fraud, 
opportunities to commit fraud and other causally relevant factors, one should 




























































































given capacity. So the criterion of effectiveness would be both served and 
would be made measurable in one important sense of general impact.
The lack o f political will which characterizes the (lack of) efforts by 
national politicians and policy-makers to combat EC fraud in general makes 
the topic of research into the prevalence of EC-fraud especially undesir­
able.38 After all, for the Member States, exposure of the overall amount of 
fraud may imply a duty to further reduce it, so more money to be spent on 
law enforcement of Community regulation while national interests may be 
deemed to have higher priority.39 In financial terms, the only effect for a 
Member State in exposing more fraud is that less Community money will 
be channelled to economic actors within that country and an increased risk 
of the need to reimburse EC funds. The positive effect of reducing unfair 
competition generated by EC fraud within a Member State may be offset 
by unfair competition in an international context as a result of less stringent 
law enforcement in other Member States.
The competence-interest conflict that stems from the -  somewhat vague -  
division of responsibilities in the Community, is another negative factor both 
in increasing combat and prevention efforts and in gaining knowledge to 
optimize these efforts. Unfortunately such barriers for more effective and 
equal law enforcement within the Community may well be inherent to its 
institutional system. I have sketched an operational overview of supervisory 
powers in terms of effectiveness and proportionality, building upon general 
principles of the Commission’s guardianship of the Treaty, Member States’ 
loyal implementation of Community regulations and recent judgements by 
the Court of Justice. This overview specified criteria both for the control 
phase and for the sanction phase of national law enforcement in a national 
and international context. Loyalty of Member States will be put to the test 
here; which state wants to support efforts for a more or less objective 
assessment of the effectiveness of its law enforcement agencies, whether in 
absolute terms or compared to other nations’ agencies?
If the responsibility for fraud control remains in the hands of the Member 
States, as autonomy politics and the subsidiarity principle demand, one 
should not expect drastic improvements, neither in action nor in analysis. 
There is a general slackness of Member States in documenting the 
seriousness of economic crime. For similar national domains as income tax 
evasion or frauds involving national subsidies, not much knowledge is 
obtained or sought. Applying the assimilation principle only may safeguard 
formal equality of legal standards but would bring Community regulations 
to the same low national standards of law enforcement.
For the Community in general, and the Commission in particular, increased 
insight into the overall level of fraud and the conditions that lead to it, is 




























































































insight leads to improved prevention and control, the Community stands to 
gain from dark-numbers knowledge (more income for the Community, less 
expenses wasted on fraud and greater fulfilment of Community policy 
objectives). Even so, the Commission may stick to other priorities, as is 
evident from an analysis of its work programme. Given the current power 
division and the problems that arise from it, it would be more practical and 
at the same time more politically sensible for the Commission to postpone 
dark number assessment. First there needs to be better cooperation between 
Member States and the Commission, more insight into reported cases (cf. 
the IRENE database) and more understanding of national fraud combatting 
systems (cf. the DAF database as item in the Commission’s work program­
me). Why seek to know more about dark-number cases if those that come 
to light at the national level are incompletely reported to the Commission? 
Why add more cases to a list, if the money that is fraudulently lost, cannot 
easily be recouped? Judging from the Commission work programme, it looks 
as if higher priority is given to settling formal issues first, like the varying 
level of sanctions in the different penal and administrative systems.
Suppose all these technical and political obstacles are straightened out and 
the competence of the Commission (or the Court of Auditors or the Court 
of Justice) to judge Member States law enforcement efforts is not questioned, 
it does not follow that better understanding of the extent of the fraud problem 
is automatic. The Member States may officially cooperate, but will the 
national law enforcement agencies also do so? And what if assessment 
threatens to reveal huge national differences, either in the overall occurrence 
of presumed fraud or in the operational quality of national anti-fraud systems, 
for example along the lines of the North-South divide? Would not this alone 
be sufficient to render such knowledge too politically sensitive? Isn’t it more 
likely that most Member States will be reluctant either to seek such 
knowledge or for such knowledge to become public?
It is part of analytic policy analysis to throw up such questions and part 
of normative policy analysis to suggest possible solutions; similarly, it is 
equally part of social science to critically evaluate knowledge claims as it 
is to advance methods of investigation. But it is part of politics and policy 





























































































Summary Economic Crime with Respect to Import and Export1
The aim of the study has been to investigate empirically economic crime 
rates connected with import and export. The inquiry contains two parts, the 
first concerning forms of economic crime, and the second concerning the 
amounts involved.
The inquiry concerning forms of criminality has been done through 
interviews with customs officers in various parts of the country as well as 
studies of court decisions and cases which are under investigation. On the 
basis of these studies a classification of economic crimes concerning import 
and export has been developed. Around forty different modes of crime 
related to import and export have been differentiated in the classifications. 
The classification has been shown to various authorities in the customs 
for feedback. Also concrete examples of the various types of criminality have 
been collected and illustrated in the report.
The other part of the study the amount of crime related to import and 
export. The investigation is based on a control action that was executed by 
the customs authority. The customs service did not think it made practically 
or financially sense to carry out the control action for the whole country. 
After all, an investigation into the amount of crime for this type of offenses 
would require physical control, a control of documents (‘administrative 
control’) and, eventually, in case of suspicion, a series of control investiga­
tions to the same object of control. At the start of the control action it was 
not known whether this was practically feasible at all with respect to a large 
number of objects of investigation since a new customs procedure had been 
enacted in 1974.
The execution of the control action required great personnel and economic 
resources.
By means of the control action an evaluation was made of:
1. the total amount of the irregularities for one year related to import or
export to and from various selected areas in Sweden;
1 Translation of the summary of a study carried out by Magnusson of the 
Brottsforeb>gande radet (the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention) “ Ekonomisk 
brottslighet vid import och export” (1981). The study is one of the very few items on 
which a rational estimate of EC-fraud can be based. Hence a translation of the Swedish 
text was deemed desirable. Thanks is due to Michel Habsmeier, Jean Monnet Fellow 





























































































2. the total amount of, what is called, irregularities related to levies;
3. how great a share of import and export in the researched domains did 
show false declarations of value.
The investigation related to imports is based on a random choice of trucks, 
boats and lorries in Stockholm, Goeteborg and Westerhose (Vasteras). 
Concerning export a random sample on shippings on boats in Goeteborg has 
been investigated. Only a few customs units in the cities participated in the 
investigation. In the schemes A. and B. it is specified which ones.
In scheme A. an assessment is shown of the total ‘value regularities’, in 
the course of 1980, calculated in millions of [Swedish] crowns. A ‘point 
estimate’ is the so called middle and most probable value. The confidence 
interval has been arrived at through the so called ‘normal approximation’ 
[see later ‘notes of explanation’ of the statistical terms; D.R.]. The customs 
irrégularités have been estimated.
TABLE A
Estimates o f Total Value Irregularities in 1980 in Millions o f Crowns
Customs Irregularities Value Irregularities
Point Interval Point Interval
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Vasberga 65 21 - 109 260 16 - 504
Norrastation 5.9 2 -  9.8 23 3 -  43
Solnaterminal 1.9 0 -  4.6 5.9 0 - 15.4
Vateras-harbour 7.6 0 - 21.8 30 0 -  81
Skandia-harbours
Import 110 0 - 252 936 0 - 2600
Export - - 1380 0 - 3520
The value irregularities with truck imports at Vastberga (Westberg) can be 
evaluated at 260 million crowns. According to very preliminary information, truck 
traffic to Vastberga amounts to circa 15 percent of truck traffic into the whole 
country. If one bases one’s estimates of the total value regularities of tmck import 
into the country over one year on the data from Vastberga, the value irregularity 
concerning the import of trucks, will amount to 1.7 billion crown for 1980.
The choice of data is very restricted, so it is not possible to draw definite 




























































































that economic criminality related to import and export appears to be voluminous, 
probably amounting to billions each year.
The rate of shipments that show irregularities has also been calculated and 
scheme B. shows the results.
TABLE B
Estimate o f the Share in Percentage o f Movements Which Involve Irregularities 





Point Interval Tax Irregu- Value Irregu-
Estimate Estimate larities larities
Vasberga 25 8 - 42 1 4
Norrastation 35 17 - 55 1 4
Solnaterminal 50 18 - 82 0.3 0.9
Vateras-harbour 33 0 - 66 2 8
Skandia-harbours
Import 33 14 - 52 0.4 3
Export 48 21 -75 [0?] 9
The results of the control action indicate that it should be meaningful to do a 
countrywide investigation in which the sample is sufficiently great in absolute 
terms, that the confidence intervals may become smaller. Such investigation will 
be very expensive.
[end of translation: D.R.]
Notes of explanation
For those not familiar with statistical terms, let me shortly explain the technical 
terms of the aforegoing summary of the Magnusson research into import-export 
fraud. In doing research, one often does not, for practical of financial reasons, 
investigate all elements that are relevant (elements being qualities of persons, 
actions, economic interactions etc.). Rather one takes a sample of observations. 
In this case, one selected, at random, a number of import-export transactions at 
certain locations. By selecting a number of import/export transactions at random, 




























































































valid for the whole group of elements one is interested in, that is, all import and 
export transaction that go on in Sweden for one year. So, given that checks in 
the sample for Vastberga over one week have revealed 25% irregularities, one 
infers that the percentage of irregularities for Vastberga for all shipments over 
the whole year is 25 as well. Of course, one does not know this figure to be true 
and most probably the true figure is either somewhat higher or lower, yet, if one 
has to pinpoint one and only one percentage, 25% is the most reasonable estimate. 
Clearly the more observations one has made (the larger the sample!), the more 
confident one can be that the true percentage for the whole population is not very 
different than the percentage of the sample. In calculating how much confidence 
one may have in an estimate, one makes a calculation (on the basis of simple 
sample theory) what the limits are of all those estimates around 25% that are still 
somewhat likely; or to put it negatively, one calculates which values cannot be 
ruled out as the true estimate of the populations given the 25% percentage found 
in the sample. Thus one arrives at an interval estimate of values that are still 
somewhat likely: the ‘confidence interval’. In calculating these margins, one 
usually stipulates that the probability for the true value to lie within the 
‘confidence interval’ should be 0.95 or even 0.99. Given the value of 25% and 
the sample size of the customs research, the lower limit is calculated at 8% and 
the upper limit at 42%. In this way one complements the precision of the point 
estimate together with its low probability of being true with an imprecise but 
highly reliable interval estimate. Due to the small number of control checks in 
the study, the margins are very wide. This is why Magnusson at the end of the 
summary recommends greater samples in future research.
As far as I understand table A., it contains absolute figures in millions crones, 
basically to calculate the annual costs of this type of crime to the national 
treasury. If we look at the point estimates, then these are the estimates for the 
selected places of control for a year. Most likely these are the numbers assessed 
by the customs authority for the one week of the control research, multiplied by 
52 or 45 (the number of operational weeks in a year). The values of the first 
column relate to the value that should have been paid in customs duties, whereas 
the second column represents the total value of the irregularities involved, that 
is, the difference of the amount actually put forward by transporters etc. to the 
customs on their declaration forms and the amount that should have been put 
forward. Given that the ratio in the upper part is 1 to 4, this means that the 
taxation or customs rate is 25% of the value. For the last two row in the table 
the ratio is closer to 1 tot 10, which indicates a much lower taxation or customs 
rate.
The fact that the confidence intervals are so huge is due to two factors; the size 
of the sample during the week of investigation concerned, and the fact that this 




























































































For purposes of estimating the dark number, table B is the interesting one. As 
far as I can make out, the first two columns give the percentage of the number 
of transactions where some kind of irregularity is involved, the first one as point 
estimate, the second as interval estimate. The third and fourth columns express 
the total value of the irregularities concerned, the fourth one as a percentage of 
the total value that has been declared. This is the most important information of 
the research and it reveals percentages that range from one to nine. The third 
column expresses the irregularities concerned in terms of the tax amounts not 
being paid, all depending on the applicable rates. These figures fall in the range 
from less than 1% to 2%. The figures in column 3 are around 1/4 of the values 
of column 4, mirroring a tax rate of approximately 25%.
In the summary no table has been given that expresses these last two columns 
of value irregularities as interval estimates next to point estimates. Clearly the 
lowest estimates that would have to be accepted as not unlikely, are close to zero. 
In the table below I have calculated the highest value within the interval that 
would still be acceptable as an estimate. The highest values within the confidence 
interval is almost 22% for Vasteras harbour and almost 23% for export from 
Skandia harbours. This means that the highest estimate for the percentage of 
customs duties that have not been paid would be around 1/4 of 22 or 23, so 
between 5 and 6 percent. So interval estimates would range between 0; and 23%.
TABLE C
Point and Interval Estimates o f the Value o f Irregularities 
Expressed as the Percentage o f Declared Value'
Customs Irregularities Value Irregularities
%
Point Estimate Interval Estimate
Tax Irr. Value Irr. Highest Estimate of Value Irr.
Vastberga 1 4 504/260x4 = 7.7
Norrastation 1 4 43/23x4 = 7.5
Solnaterminal 0.3 0.9 15.4/5.9x0.9 = 2.34
Vasteras-harbour 2 8 81/30x8 = 21.6
Skandia-harbours
Import 0.4 3 2600/936x3 = 8.3
Export [0?] 9 3520/1380x9 = 22.9
’ Both the percentage that represents the value irregularity/mistake (the value amount evaded) 




























































































So, assuming sufficient similarity between EC-fraud and Swedish import-export 
fraud, one can infer a dark number estimate for EC-fraud from the results from 
the Swedish study. The best point estimate should then be based on columns 3 
and 4 of table B. This means that the most likely figures for the overall value 
of transactions affected by fraud (irregularity) is between 0.9 and 9 percent. Given 
the applicable tax scales of 25%, the overall value of tax not paid ranges between 





























































































1. Generally big scandals are reported in the media. See also Keller &  Maier (1987) and 
Tutt (1989).
2. See for example, the European Parliament (1989a). The British House of Lords 
reports talks of similar figures under reference to scientific experts such as Tiedemann
(1988) or Magnusson (1982). The figure of 10 per cent is also mentioned in Tiedemann 
(1980), Vervaele (1989), and Morselli & Taminiau (1990).
3. See for example, Carey of the European Court of Auditors in the House of Lords 
report (pp. 8-9); and in De Doelder (1990, p. 12); or Mennens, from the UCLAF, in De 
Doelder (1990, p. 33).
4. Cf. also Van de Wijngaart (1983) and Scarlett (1991) who express worries about 
different definitions of fraud. Similar worries underlie the attempts to reach a 
Community wide concept of crime and sanctions, as the Commission’s draft proposal 
for Community sanctions in 1976 and recent attempts to revive this drive for 
harmonization.
5. The expenses occurring under the CAP consist basically of subsidies to agricultural 
products when exported. The subsidies are paid out of the EAGGF-Guarantee section 
of the budget (European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund).
6. The 1989 Commission Colloquium examined the legal protection of the financial 
interests of the Community, organized by DG XX (Financial Control) and the Legal 
Service of the Commission. Since then several conferences on legal aspects of EC fraud 
have been held, organized by Directorate General XX together with recently established 
national associations of lawyers studying the protection of the Community’s financial 
interests.
7. Tiedemann, in his statement before the House of Lords Select Committee, describes 
the same vicious circle.
8. Regulation 283/72 for fraud cases with respect to EAGGF-Guarantee (now replaced 
by Regulation 595/91) and Regulation 1552/89 for traditional own income.
9. Setting up the IRENE database is part of the Commission working programme (item 
27, see for a further description and evaluation section 2.2.). IRENE is not a publicly 
accessible database, and as such cases may be said to “ disappear”  into it as far as the 
general EC public is concerned.
10. Annex 2 of the progress reports over 1990 (SEC (91) 456 final) and 1991 (SEC (92) 





























































































11. The EAGGF-Guarantee frauds for 1990 (export subsidies) include around 400 cases 
(over 10,000 ECU) that average 200,000 ECU. For 1991 there has been a reduction in 
the total number of cases and the average amounts for EAGGF-Guarantee.
12. In his 1988 publication (p. 107) Tiedemann mentions 20 per cent, but since this is 
still high, higher than 10 per cent, it counts as an argument for the claim that fraud 
against the EC should be estimated at 10 per cent, at least.
13. The Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 3 January 1978, pp. 5 and 7, reports these cases 
as funny rather than serious incidents: “ pigs become cows” .
14. It would be scientifically useful to analyze the results of all extended controls 
exercised over the years by officials in a variety of domains, be them routine or 
extraordinary controls. However, the results of such controls are not generally available. 
Newspapers are not informed about most of these controls, and when they are, they are 
inclined to select the biggest fraud cases or the most dramatic outcomes.
15. The true percentages are unknown but the values can be calculated on the basis of 
the percentages found and simple sample theory. See appendix for full text of the 
summary of Magnusson’s research and for explanation for statistical terms.
16. Levi (1985, pp. 62-4) also recommends samples, or ‘sample surveys', that is, im 
depth audits of samples (for example measuring the adequacy of tax returns); Levi refers 
to Long, 1980, and the Keith Committee, 1982.
17. For example a fish quota fraud study listed a number of control samples taken over 
the year by law enforcement agencies, but could not base any hard conclusion on it 
exactly for this reason (Vervaele, Ruimschotel & Widdershoven, 1990, p. 78). In fact, 
using control outcomes as a method to estimate the percentage of fraud for the totality 
of cases, suffers from the same defect as using the official penal registrations as an 
index for all cases, the black numbers: it is a sample of all cases, where it should be 
suspected that strong selective mechanisms are operative.
18. For example, the New York Kennedy International Airport Customs official Paul 
Mazurkewitz, revealing some of his tactics in an interview “ It’s a giveaway if the man 
backs off seven steps while the wife talks to me” (International Herald Tribune, 10 July 
1992, p. 2). The Dutch tax inspectorate of the Finance Department uses statistically 
refined methods that specify for each relatively homogeneous group of tax payers (taxi 
drivers, butchers, etc.) what the average costs are and the average deviation from the 
average. In this way the system automatically signals cases that deserve further 
investigation.
19. In practice evaluation of targeting is performed under names like benchmarking or 
updating the ‘target group profile’.
20. Aselect allocation of controls has the further advantage of deterrence and prevention. 
Any transaction, no matter how innocent it may appear, has a chance to be subjected to 
control. Of course this method is only illuminating if the controls executed indeed are 




























































































21. Regulation 4045/89 for EAGGF-Guarantee does mention evaluation (art. 9.4) but this 
evaluation refers to the progress made and will be based mainly on Member States 
detailed reports on the application of the Regulation (such as difficulties encountered and 
measures taken to overcome these).
22. The Treaty of Maastricht on the European Monetary Union, recognizes the Court of 
Auditors as an Institution of the Community. Cf. arts. 4 and 188a-c.
23. See for a general description of the role of the European Court of Auditors Kok
(1989).
24. A fundamental proposal to this extent was made as early as 1976, but this has never 
been adopted (cf. Mulder, 1985). Recent vitalization occurred after the Court’s ruling 
in Case 68/88 (cf. item 39 of the Commission work programme in the context of the anti­
fraud policy).
25. Cf. the annual Court of Auditors reports, especially the one referring to the year 1987; 
see also Kok (1989).
26. Basically this notion is close to consonance or avoidance of dissonance models 
between various elements used at an individual level (cf. Festinger, 1957; or Heider, 
1958). Although this article is mainly descriptive-analytic in character, it also uses the 
normative and explanatory perspectives of governmental institutions as rational actors 
(cf. Allison, 1971, for a comparison of various models of analysis). The notorious 
‘dynamics’ between the Community and Member States, and the difficulty to explain 
it properly, is commented on by various writers, see for example Weiler (1981).
27. The Court has built up its doctrine on ‘proportionality’ and ‘effectiveness’ over the 
years. An important earlier case in the series that built up to the 68/88 decision is case 
50/76, the Amsterdam Bulb Case. See also Scarlett (1992).
28. Cf. Rasmussen (1986) on the political function of the Court of Justice.
29. Cf. art. 209a of Title II, art. 78i of Title III and art. 183 a of Title IV.
30. Member States can reduce the disharmony of (political and power) interests and legal 
responsibility (now assumed to exist after the Court’s 68/88 decision) if they stress (or 
adopt) a policy responsibility for the proper protection of Community law. The Dutch 
Minister of Justice (1992) has expounded the strong legal interpretation of art. 5 of the 
Treaty as a policy view; “ the Commission should be able to assess independently how, 
with what intensity and with what means, the Member States control compliance with 
Community law and how they react to violations of Community law that have become 
manifest” . If my theoretical interpretation of (re)establishing balances is correct, one 
should -  over the next few years -  witness more Member States outlining that they not 
only have a legal duty to adhere to the principle of assimilation, but that they ‘voluntarily’ 
incorporate the principle in their policies.




























































































32. “ It is hard to overestimate the importance of case 68/88”  (Pipkom, in Commission 
Seminar, 1989).
33. This is not merely a hypothetical danger. Quite clearly large portions of the Member 
States’ national legislation and policy making are not effective, nor is it equally customary 
for all Member States to evaluate their own effectiveness.
34. These formal aspects of sanctions are the subject of a comparative study requested 
by the Council of Justice Ministers on 13 November 1991. The study will be completed 
by the first quarter of 1993 (see also item 39 of the Commission work programme).
35. The Court of Justice statements in case 68/88 still leave some room to interpret 
similarity -  and hence effectiveness and proportionality -  in a formal, potential sense. 
The letter of the President of the Commission following this case inquired after real 
equivalence within the Member States, but from the description of their response (cf. 
Commission, 1992, p. 70) one has to infer that they have conveniently conceived of the 
question as inquiring after potential or formal similarity (“ national legal systems are able 
to impose appropriate penalties for fraud against the Community budget” ).
36. The international dimension of the fraud problem is stressed by many investigations 
and declared as a major shortcoming of law enforcement by a special Court of Auditors 
report (1992b). Member States’ law enforcement agencies sometimes complain of lack 
of cooperation from another Member State. For example British customs officials 
complain that their Italian colleagues do not sufficiently follow up on the information 
given on Italian traders in meat fraud cases (Financial Times, 28 September 1992).
37. Cf. Simon (1964) for a general discussion of the change between goals and conditions 
in organizations.
38. Lack of political will to combat fraud actively is observed by various writers: House 
of Lords (1989), Sherlock and Harding (1991), as well as by the Court of Auditors, the 
Parliament and the Commission on various occasions.
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